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ARGUMENT 
The goal of damages is to make a plaintiff whole. Workers' Compensation law, with its 
references to a "whole man," reflects this familiar concept. Permanent disability recognizes that 
some work injuries are significant enough to impact a worker's earning capacity, and when this 
occurs, a worker is deserving of compensation to offset this future wage loss. A rating of permanent 
disability is an appraisal of the injured worker's present and future ability to engage in gainful 
activity. Idaho Code § 72-425. 
Idaho's civil survivorship statute limits lost earnings to those actually suffered prior to a 
plaintiff's death. See Idaho Code§ 5-327(2). This is consistent with the legal tenet that damages 
are intended to make a plaintiff whole, as none ofus have a work life expectancy that exceeds death. 
Workers' Compensation provides a narrower scope of remedies than a tort action. Many 
forms of relief that are recognized in tort are not allowed under Workers' Compensation, such as 
loss of consortium. "In compensation, unlike tort, the only injuries compensated for are those 
which either actually or presumptively produce disability and thereby presumably affect earning 
power." 1-1 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law§ 1.03 at [4] (2015). Claimant asks this Court to 
provide him with a remedy that would be unavailable in civil law, in a system that has historically 
provided far fewer forms of relief. Moreover, Claimant requests a remedy for a loss of earning 
power for a party who has no present or future earning power. This is contrary to the fundamental 
purposes of Workers' Compensation. 
The distinction between Workers' Compensation and torts is seen most clearly in the area of 
liability. Workers' Compensation is a no-fault system, and ''the test is not the relation of an 
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individual's personal quality (fault) to an event, but the relationship of an event to an employment." 
Larson's, § l.03 at [1]. The no-fault nature of Workers' Compensation is reflected in an award for 
permanent partial impairment. A permanent impairment rating is typically provided upon a 
claimant reaching medical stability and payment becomes due soon after. There is no fact-finding 
or adjudication required to trigger a surety's payment obligation. As the Court said in Thacker v. 
Jerome Co-op. Creamery, referring to permanent impairment, 'the award does not fix the right to, 
only determines, the amount of compensation for the injury. The right to compensation is fixed by 
statute, the amount is merely an administrative detail." 61 Idaho 726, 26, 106 P.2d 863,865 (1940) 
(quoting City of Milwaukee v. Roth, 185 Wis. 307,201 N.W. 251,252 (1924).) 
Permanent partial disability in excess of impairment is a different creature. This concept 
recognizes that in some cases, a worker's loss of earning capacity is not adequately remedied by an 
impairment rating and more compensation is due based upon personal characteristics of the worker. 
An award of permanent partial disability in excess of impairment is always based on personal 
characteristics of a worker using the pertinent non-medical factors set forth in Idaho Code§ 72-430 
because this is the only scenario in which disability would exceed impairment. In other words, 
permanent disability in excess of impairment by its very nature requires a formal fact-finding 
process to be determined. Because it is based upon characteristics personal to a claimant, 
permanent partial disability in excess of impairment cannot become a liquidated award until a 
formal fact-finding occurs, or it is stipulated by the parties. Claimant argues that permanent partial 
disability in excess of impairment is similar to permanent impairment because it is also granted by 
statute. This is incorrect. While a claimant with a compensable work injury is always entitled to an 
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impairment award, a claimant is only entitled to an award for permanent disability in excess of 
impairment upon an evidentiary showing. See e.g., McCabe by JoAnn Stores, Inc., 145 Idaho 91, 
96, 175 P .3d 780, 785 (2007). In the present case, any permanent disability in excess of impairment 
is unspecified because no determination was made prior to Claimant's death. 
Idaho Code § 72-431 is a survivorship statute. It provides survivors with a mechanism to 
sue for enforcement of a liquidated award, and gives an order of succession. It is nothing more, and 
this is evidenced plainly of the face of the statute which limits its applicability to benefits "specified 
and unpaid." The statute was never intended to confer the type of award Claimant is now 
requesting from this Court. 
In briefing, Claimant failed to address the most fundamental issue before the Court- what, 
specifically, is meant by "specified and unpaid"? The term "specified and unpaid" is a modifier on 
the noun "income benefits," which functions grammatically to restrict the broader category of 
"income benefits." If the Legislature had intended the statute to apply to the type of award Claimant 
seeks, it would never have imposed limiting language. "The surplusage canon holds that it is no 
more the court's function to revise by subtraction than by addition." Antonin Scalia and Bryan 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 174 (2012). Claimant attempts to apply 
§ 72-431 to a broader class of"income benefits" than those provided for in the statute, and in so 
doing is asking this Court to subtract key language that changes the meaning of the text. 
Defendants paid Claimant's permanent impairment award in full. (R., Vol. 1, p. 8). 
Claimant seeks to recover an unwarranted disability compensation windfall through benefits for a 
loss of earning capacity by party who has no present and future ability to earn wages. In doing so, 
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Claimant relies upon an interpretation of§ 72-431 that is contrary to the language of the statute and 
Idaho case law. 
1. Claimant is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal 
Claimant is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because this is a case of first impression. 
A case of first impression does not constitute an area of settled law; therefore, a request for attorney 
fees should be denied. Purco Fleet Services, Inc., v. Idaho State Department of Finance, 140 Idaho 
121, 126, 90 P.3d 346, 352 (2004). Accord, Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 
Idaho 257, 207 P .3d 988 (2009). 
Prior to this case, the Court has not been presented with the question of what benefits 
survive the death of an injured worker for reasons unrelated to the industrial injury by interpreting 
the text of Idaho Code § 72-431. Claimant argues this Court conclusively addressed Idaho Code 
§ 72-431 prior to this case, in Palomo v. JR. Simplot Company. 31 Idaho 314,955 P.2d 1093 
(1998). Respondent's Brief at p. 7. Defendants disagree. The question presented to the Court in 
Palomo was whether two sureties that entered into a joint stipulation that a claimant was totally and 
permanently disabled were required to continue payments after her death. Id. at 315, 1094. The 
Court simply said that § 72-431 did not apply because the parties stipulated that the claimant was 
totally and permanently disabled: ''the statute is specific in referring only to whether or not the 
employee receives a total permanent disability award." Id. Moreover, since the parties had already 
entered into a stipulation and begun making payments, the award had already been liquidated. 
Therefore, whether the income benefits had been "specified and unpaid," was not at issue in 
Palomo. Notably, the Court has never addressed the question of what is meant by "specified and 
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unpaid," under§ 72-431. Defendants contend that the interpretation of this term is at the crux of 
this case and dispositive. 
Claimant's reference to the Industrial Commission's decision in Havens v. ISIF suffers from 
a similar defect. 2009 IIC 0745 (2009). The claimant in that case was permanently and totally 
disabled, and there was no issue of survivorship because the claimant was alive. The issue before 
the Commission was an allocation ofliability between two sureties. Havens is clearly 
distinguishable from the present case. 
This case presents a novel question which is one of first impression under Idaho law. The 
Industrial Commission itself so acknowledged in this case when it stated, "[t]he inheritability of 
disability benefits, including the disparate treatment of injured workers who are total and 
permanently disabled versus profoundly disabled, is a perplexing issue of some import, the 
resolution of which will provide helpful guidance to the workers' compensation legal community. 
The Commission agrees that these matters are deserving of immediate review by the Court." 
(R., Vol. I, p. 51). 
In sum, the issue presented to the Court is a pure question oflaw. The question presented is 
one which the Industrial Commission agreed was deserving of review by this Court. Attorney fees 
are not appropriate in this instance. 
2. This Court may analyze Equal Protection claims 
At the outset, it should be noted that Equal Protection is only at issue if the Court accepts 
Claimant's interpretation of the statute. Defendants' interpretation of§ 72-431 is consistent with the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
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Claimant asserts that Defendants' Equal Protection arguments are unfounded because the 
Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction to address constitutional challenges. Defendants 
agree that the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction to address constitutional challenges; 
however, this Court certainly does. 
Claimant asserts that a rational basis is served by limiting the class of persons who can 
receive benefits thereby creating "certainty" for Idaho industry. Claimant's assertion that his 
interpretation of the statute somehow serves industry is completely at odds with its logical outcome. 
Allowing permanent partial disability benefits to survive the death of an injured worker would only 
promote uncertainty by enabling heirs to collect an unwarranted disability compensation windfall 
well beyond a worker's death. 
3. The statute is ambiguous 
Claimant argues that Idaho Code § 72-4 31 is plain and unambiguous. Respondent's Brief 
at 6. Claimant states, "Idaho Code§ 72-431 is plain on its face. It allows the inheritability of 
permanent disability benefits when certain criteria are met." Id. Claimant provides no analysis of 
the text of the statute to support his assertion beyond applying it to various facts and asserting that it 
is applicable without any further explanation. 
A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 68, 2 P.3d 
905,908 (2003). The Industrial Commission found more than one reasonable construction of the 
statute at issue here, with the dissent arguing that the majority's interpretation of the statute was 
incorrect. 
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The statute contains the term "disability'' which has more than one meaning under Workers' 
Compensation law. "Disability'' is an umbrella term which can mean permanent partial disability, 
permanent total disability, temporary total disability, and temporary partial disability. "Disability'' 
also has a different meaning depending on whether it is inclusive or exclusive of an impairment 
rating. 
While "disability" is defined under Idaho Code § 72-102(10), the term "specified and 
unpaid" is not defined anywhere in Chapter 72. We know this term is significant because it is 
contained in the statute. "These words cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been 
used." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65, 56 S.Ct. 312, 319 (1936) (per Roberts, J.) It is a 
cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause and 
word of a statute. See e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 364, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1498 (2000). 
The terms "specified and unpaid" have never been defined by an Idaho appellate court in this 
precise context. The meaning of§ 72-431 changes depending on how one interprets the terms 
"specified and unpaid." 
Because § 72-431 is capable of more than one reasonable construction, it is an ambiguous 
statute under Idaho law. 
4. Idaho Code§ 72-431 codified the common law on survivorship of benefits 
Claimant argues that the Legislature intended to abrogate the common law by enacting 
Idaho Code § 72-201, the exclusive remedy provision. This argument demonstrates a flawed 
understanding of§ 72-201. This Code section simply provides that Workers' Compensation is the 
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exclusive remedy for workplace injuries and prevents an employer from being sued in two separate 
venues. 
If the Legislature had intended to abrogate the common law with respect to survivability, as 
Claimant suggests, why would it have enacted a statute that reflected the common Jaw? Idaho Code 
§ 72-431 limits survivability to benefits which are "specified and unpaid," at death. The cases prior 
to the enactment of the statute made it clear that only a claim in the form ofliquidated damages 
survives the death of a claimant. See Appellants 'Brief at 14-17. The Court stated in Mahoney v. 
City of Payette, referring to a scheduled disability award, "the only ground upon which such an 
award survives is that it was liquidated damages inuring to the benefit of the employee, becoming 
part of his estate, and therefore not compensation for disability which might otherwise cease with 
his death." 64 Idaho 443 at 43, 133 P.2d 927,929 (1943) (emphasis added). As the dissent 
summarized in the present case, ''the cases stress that disability is a replacement for wages, and you 
do not earn wages after your death." (R., Vol. 1, p. 38). 
It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that any legislative change of the common 
law requires "exactness of expression," and that a statute should not ''be extended beyond the 
necessary and unavoidable meaning ofits terms." Sha,feldv. Richardson, 133 F.2d 340,341, 76 
U.S. App. D.C. 378, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1942). It is to be presumed that no change in the common law 
was intended unless language employed clearly indicates such intention. Cox v. St. Anthony Bank 
and Trust Co., 41 Idaho 776,242 P. 785 (1925). There is no language, express or otherwise, in the 
text of§ 72-431 to suggest that the Legislature intended to change the common law. To the 
contrary, the text of§ 72-431 mirrors the common law in effect at the time of its enactment. 
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5. Claimant seeks a benefit that is not "specified" as required by statute 
The statute clearly limits benefits to those "specified and unpaid." Claimant argues that 
permanent partial impairment is unliquidated in the same manner as pennanent partial disability 
because the Commission retains the power to reject the opinion of a medical expert as to 
impairment. To support this proposition, Claimant cites to Urry v. Walker and Fox Masonry 
Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 769 P.2d 1122 (1989). Claimant misapplies Urry to the present case. 
Urry is not a case about a liquidated award; Urry is a case about the weight accorded to expert 
testimony. 
In Urry, the claimant had two distinct workplace injuries and received the same impairment 
rating- 20 percent whole person- for both from his treating physician. Id. at 752, 1124. Thus, 
claimant's second injury was subsumed by the first and he was not entitled to any additional 
impairment compensation. Id. Claimant argued that he was entitled to additional compensation 
because his injury was no longer asymptomatic and pain caused him additional functional 
limitations. Id. On appeal, the employer argued the Commission should be bound to accept the 
opinion of claimant's treating physician as conclusive. Id. at 755, 1127. The Court disagreed and 
held that the Industrial Commission, as a fact finder, could determine the appropriate weight to give 
to a physician's expert testimony. Id. at 756, 1128. 
The language of Urry that Claimant misapplies to the present case is simply a restatement of 
the general rule that a trier of fact can chose the appropriate weight to accord expert testimony. Urry 
is simply not applicable here. 
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In addition, Claimant perplexingly asserts that "Idaho Code § 72-431 does not require that 
income benefits are specified and unpaid when the employee dies." Respondent 's Brief at 11. This 
statement is clearly and unequivocally at odds with the text of the statute itself. Idaho Code§ 72-
431 clearly states, "the income benefits specified and unpaid at the employee's death." 
In making this argument, Claimant seems to be asserting that the language ''whether or not 
accrued or due," cancels out the requirement that the award be "specified and unpaid." Tiris 
argument is without merit. The Supreme Court will not construe a statute in a way which makes 
mere surplusage of provisions included therein. Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 692 P .2d 
332 (1984). Moreover, it is logically inconsistent the that Legislature would have included two 
contradictory terms within the same piece of statutory text. 
Assuming Claimant is arguing that the two portions of this statute are in tension, this 
argument is also without merit, and is betrayed by the facts of the present case. When Claimant 
died, he had been given a permanent partial impairment award. (R., Vol. I, p. 7). The award was 
being paid out periodically over time. As such, the award was "specified and unpaid." However, 
the full balance of the award was not "accrued and due" at the time of death. The surety continued 
to pay out the impairment award over time until it was paid in full. (R., Vol. I, p. 8). Thus, the 
impairment award had been "specified and unpaid," but was not "accrued and due" when Claimant 
died. 
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6. Legislative intent is reflected in the Model Act 
Claimant asserts that, "the only intent that can be discerned from the legislature with respect 
to the Model Act is that the legislature intended to depart from it, as evidenced by the 
LC. § 72-431 's departure from the model language." Respondent's Brief at 11. 
Claimant's contention that the Legislature somehow departed from the language of the 
Model Act is unsupported by the text on its face. The text of the Model Act's counterpart to 
Idaho Code § 72-431 is set forth in Appellants 'Brief at page 28. The dissent in the Industrial 
Commission decision here provided text of the Model Act with deletions and insertions made to 
generate Idaho Code§ 72-431 as it was passed in 1971. (R., Vol. I, p. 39). One only has to 
examine the text of the Model Act in comparison to Idaho Code § 72-431 to see that the language is 
nearly identical. 
The text of the Model Act references the section on scheduled impairment tables. The 
Model Act has a different numbering system than the Idaho Code, however, the section follows the 
tables in the Idaho Code as it does in the Model Act. As the dissent explained in the present case, 
"[i]t is inherently improbable that the drafters of the 1971 recodification used the Model Code 
section regarding survivability of impairment benefits, changing only a few words but intending it 
to result in an entirely different section which applied to disability instead of impairment. Further, if 
the intent was to apply to disability it seems the new law would have also included a provision for 
application to impairment." (R., Vol. I, p. 40). 
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Claimant is incorrect in asserting that the Legislature chose to depart from the Model Act, 
because when one accounts for the numbering system, the language of Idaho Code § 72-431 is 
materially identical to the Model Act. 
7. Claimant misinterprets applicable persuasive authority 
Claimant cannot cite to any persuasive authority that supports his interpretation of the law. 
Claimant argues that Larson's treatise does not contain any persuasive authority because "Idaho is 
not other jurisdictions." Respondent's Brief at 13. It is fundamentally appropriate for Courts to 
look to how other jurisdictions have analyzed a similar issue for persuasive authority when 
confronted with an issue of first impression. Moreover, the recodification of Workers' 
Compensation law which gave us the omnibus bill that included § 72-431 was part of a national 
recodification effort. See generally, Council of State Governments, Program of Suggested State 
Legislation, Preface to Section by Section Commentary (1965). The Model Act was used by many 
jurisdictions throughout the country in drafting their Workers' Compensation laws. The fact that 
Claimant cannot cite a single case for the proposition that disability in excess of impairment would 
survive a claimant's non-industrial death is significant and instructive. 
Claimant argues that§ 89.03, entitled "Unaccrued Payments," is the more applicable portion 
of Larson 's and cites to the following passage, ''when, however, the award, although for a fixed 
number of weeks, is paid weekly or periodically, most jurisdictions in the absence of a special 
statute to the contrary have held that the heirs have no claim upon the unaccrued payments ... " 
Respondent's Brief at 14. 
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Claimant asserts that§ 72-431 is a "special statute," but provides no analysis of why it 
would fall within the exception. Claimant's argument is only persuasive if you ignore the fact that 
the statute requires the benefit to be "specified" in order to trigger survivability. The section cited 
by Claimant contains a footnote with one such state statute. Notably, the statute cited in this 
footnote as an example of a "special statute," is a Missouri statute that applies exclusively to that 
state's list of scheduled and unscheduled impairments. 7-89 Larson '.s Workers' Compensation Law 
§ 89 .03 (2015) (referencing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.230). Thus, the section cited by Claimant from 
Larson's is entirely consistent with Defendants' interpretation of§ 72-431 and inconsistent with that 
offered by Claimant. 
8. There is no justification to depart from this Court's holding in Brown 
In Brown and Davaz, this Court held that an evaluation of permanent disability should 
reflect claimant's personal and economic circumstances at the time of hearing. Brown v. Home 
Depot, 152 Idaho 605,272 P.3d 577 (2012); Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 
870 P.2d 1292 (1994). Defendants argued that the Commission's 1988 decision in Mary Martin v. 
Nampa Highway District is no longer good law in light of these subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions. Appellants' Brief at p. 35. Claimant responds that this Court's decisions in Brown and 
Davaz provide "general rules" and should not be applicable to this case. Respondent's Brief 
at 14. 
The Court's reasoning in Brown and Davaz is consistent with Defendants' analysis of the 
facts of the present case. In these decisions, the Court recognized that permanent disability should 
be evaluated at the time of hearing because it is designed to compensate for the worker's present 
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and future loss of earning potential. The Court in Davaz plainly stated that, "spirit of workers' 
compensation law would not be served by awarding disability based on an antecedent, but no longer 
existing need." 125 Idaho 333,337,870 P.2d 1292, 1296. There is no clearer example of"an 
antecedent, but no longer existing need," than the present case in which the worker is deceased and 
has no present or future earning capacity. 
fu Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., the claimant relocated from Priest River to 
Missoula, Montana, where he obtained a job that paid as much or more than his time of injury 
employment. Id. at 337, 1296. Davaz argued that Priest River was his applicable labor market, as 
this would have presumably afforded him a higher percentage of permanent partial disability. Id. 
In rejecting Davaz' argument, the Court noted, "[i]n this case, the facts clearly show that Davaz has 
no lost earning capacity," and that "it would not serve the purpose of workers' compensation law to 
award Davaz disability based on the market from which he and his family have permanently 
emigrated." Id. 
In Davaz, the Court acknowledged that ''there may be instances where a market other than 
the claimant's resident at the time of hearing is relevant. .. and such determinations should be made 
on a case by case basis based on individual facts and circumstances." Id. at 337, 1296. The Court 
cited to the Lyons case as an example of when it might be appropriate to analyze a labor market 
other than the claimant's labor market at the time of hearing. Id. (referencing Lyons v. Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403,565 P.2d 1360 (1977).) 
In Lyons, the claimant moved into a labor market with fewer opportunities for employment. 
98 Idaho 403, 565 P .2d 1360. The Court held that it was appropriate to consider both labor markets 
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because, "a claimant should not be permitted to achieve permanent disability by changing his labor 
market." Id. at 407, 1364. The Court noted that "limiting the scope of consideration to the 
geographic area surrounding claimant's new home would result in an unwarranted disability 
compensation windfall." Id. 
In Brown v. Home Depot, the issue was whether the claimant's permanent disability should 
be measured at the time he reached medical stability or four years later when the hearing was held. 
152 Idaho 605,272 P.3d 577 (2012). The Court looked to the language of§ 72-425, which defines 
permanent disability as a measure of the claimant's present and probable future ability to engage in 
gainful activity. Id. at 609, 581. The Court reasoned that determining a claimant's disability at the 
time of hearing served the purposes of the statute because, ''there is no present opportunity for the 
Commission to make its determination apart from the time of hearing." Id. The Court, citing to 
Davaz, reinforced that "it is the claimant's personal and economic circumstances at the time of 
hearing, not some earlier time, that are relevant to the disability determination." Id. 
The Court allowed that there may be a limited exception to its holding, stating, "( w ]e 
recognize that this holding, if not qualified, may create an incentive for litigants to seek to expedite 
or delay the hearing in order to take advantage of changing economic conditions." Id. The Court 
made it clear that this was a limited exception and would apply "in an instance where the 
Commission perceives that a party has taken an action that has the effect of manipulating the 
outcome of a disability determination." Id. 
Thus, though the Court did qualify its holdings in Davaz and Brown, an exception is not 
appropriate in the present case. It is clear that the Court provided a limited type of exception out of 
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concern for parties engaging in gamesmanship or receiving an ''unwarranted disability 
compensation windfall." 98 Idaho at 407, 565 P.2d at 1364. This is the complete opposite of the 
present case, in which survivors of a claimant who has no present or future earning capacity would 
receive a windfall if disability was not evaluated at the time of hearing. Claimant provides no 
analysis of Brown or Davaz to explain to this Court why it should depart from its rule. 
To the contrary, the Court's reasoning in Brown and Davaz make it clear that it is 
appropriate to apply the holding to the present case. In both decisions, the Court repeatedly stressed 
that the purpose of disability is best served by evaluating a claimant's personal and economic needs 
at the time of hearing. The Claimant in this case has no present or future loss of earning potential. 
The spirit of Workers' Compensation and the purpose of disability would not be served by granting 
an unwarranted disability compensation windfall based on an antecedent but no longer existing 
need. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in determining what benefits 
survive the death of an injured worker, Appellants respectfully request the Court reverse the 
decision in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this 30 day of November, 2015. 
Law Offices of Kent W. Day 
By: -z::..__ /L--
Lea L. Kear 
Attorney for Defendants/ Appellants 
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